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The body of video games: devices, positions, emotions
Mathieu Triclot, assistant professor, University of Technology, Belfort-Montbéliard, France 
Raymond Bellour's analysis, in his 2009 book Le Corps du cinéma: Hypnoses, émotions, animalités
of those emotions specific to the film medium ventures into previously uncharted territory.  His
conception of film-viewing as a corporeal experience is of interest in that it calls attention to the
production of a certain psycho-physical state on the part of the viewer. The aim of this article is to
consider those features specific to video games and to cinema in terms of this relationship between
human bodies and Bellour's conception of audiovisual ones.
The term "the body of cinema" makes for a double remove in regard to the relationship between
audience and film. To talk of cinema as possessing a body is, to begin with, to stop talking about
text or structure: it is to break with the concept of film as a remote, hermetically sealed object.
Cinema does not exist unless it mobilizes in one way or another, depending on unique and variable
conditions, the bodies of its viewers. "Go to the movies" means more than simply "see a film": it
means, first of all, to accept the fact that one's body will submit to a reduction in its mobility and
that one's mind will focus, for the duration, on a given set of visual and auditory stimuli, and all this
in the dark confinement of the theater space (Metz, 1977). 
But to speak of "the body of cinema" is also to look at films from a new angle. The notion of film as
body compels  us  to  consider  two other  dimensions;  first,  the  materiality  of  the  image-making
devices, which defines cinema; second, the materiality of moving images themselves: acceleration
and slowdown, chopping and breaking of symmetrical patterns, syncopated rhythms: all the barely
perceptible vibrations that seem to vivify the screen, along with the echo effect generated by the
rapid passage of a series of connected images. 
This view of cinema as the interplay of various bodies – the apparatus,  the viewer,  the film –
resonates with the problems and stakes involved in a theory of play, of the act of playing, to be
found in studies devoted to video games. The question of the player's positions and of body gestures
during play has been largely overlooked in game studies developed over the course of the past
decade.  The  emergence  of  research  works  focused  on  the  processes  of  subjectivization,  the
formation of play-related sites and subcultures, and on the impact of these factors on the game-
playing experience, opens a new field of study in the world of video-game research (Berry, 2012,
Boutet,  2012a,  Calleja,  2011,  Galbraith,  2011,  Genvo,  2008,  Jonsson  and  Verhagen,  2011,
Kirkpatrick, 2011, Sicart, 2011, Triclot, 2011). 
With the body as point of departure, all sorts of ways of rethinking the relationship between film
and video games emerge. Applying the concept of a "body" to film and to video games means
reregistering them in a long history of visual-image devices, in which some aspect of the movement
on the screen wins over the bodies of the viewers (Williams, 1991). In this sense, it is astonishing
that  consideration  of  the  corporality  of  certain  cultural  practices  originates  in  consideration  of
cinema and not of games, seeing as how the impact of a game on each participant's body constitutes
one of the more obvious elements of the game-playing situation.
On the most abstract level, the video-game situation can be described as a sort of design layout
featuring a living body and a strange technical apparatus, a computer linked to a screen, whereby
certain affects are produced and maintained. The video game is based on an unusual distribution of
movement:  a  body in  which nearly  all  mobility  is  concentrated in  the hands – akin to  certain
domestic activities, such as sewing; this nearly motionless body controls, even as it is controlled by,
a second body that is not only graceful, agile, and extremely mobile but also indefatigable, launched
in the mission to conquer outdoor spaces located in the space defined by the screen. The video-
game player's experience is based on the intersection of several sets of contrasting pairs: mobility
versus immobility; whole-body consciousness versus hand-only reactivity, safe home space versus
hostile surrounding space, the screen's bright light, with its ability to dazzle the eyes, versus the
brightness  that  results  from this  scintillation...  The  physical  effects  of  video-game play  on  the
human  body  –  what  with  the  variation  of  a  given  game's  possible  layouts  and  its  rhythmic
modulations – constitute a vast potential source of insights into the activity of play that has yet to be
recognized as such, much less tapped by, those laboring in the field of game studies. This primary
layer of the video-game experience functions independent of any specific images presented on the
screen, without the support of algorithms and rules, indifferent to the symbolic constructions of
virtual universes.
Our aim in this article is to decipher the various possible bodies of the video-game medium, assisted
by the guidelines of Bellour's analysis of cinema. We will thus examine three elements of the issue
of video-game bodies; first, the relationship between the various material aspects of video games, in
the light of the history of cinematography; second, the production of the film-watching and video-
game-playing state of mind, relative to hypnosis; and third, the primary emotions associated with
the video-game setup.
Devices, bodies of vision 
Raymond Bellour  devotes the first  chapter of  Le corps du cinéma to  a history of vision-based
technologies.  The  cinematographic  apparatus  constitutes  the  primary  body  of  cinema  –  taking
precedence over that of the viewers and that of the films viewed. It is not so much the strictly
technical dimension of the apparatus that is of importance here as it is the place that the apparatus
holds in the spectatorial body, the subjective positions that it summons up, the material and spatial
layout of the desire to see. A side trip through the history of cinema will allow us to evaluate just
what elements of the usage of prior devices the video-game medium salvages and also just what
elements it chooses to jettison: to examine the way in which, within this modified and modifying
medium new ways of seeing, new methods of engagement with the images, are composed.
Bellour conceives of cinema as the culmination of a group of heterogeneous technical lineages:
frontal projection, breakdown of movement, 360°-view devices, wax museums, and other methods
of exposition by which the presence of realistic representations became the dominant feature of
visual entertainment for the masses. The effect of cinema turns out to be extremely composite,
beyond the realistic effect of the projected images. This description of Bellour's opens three routes
for reflection in regard not only to what the video-game apparatus owes to cinema but also to where
it splits off from cinema, obliged as it is, instead, to reenlist devices of an earlier vintage. 
First,  the  theme  of  bricolage,  the  adaptation  of  diverse  and  otherwise  unrelated  vision-based
technologies, is characteristic of video games as well, since they arise at the juncture of multiple
technological  lineages.  In  fact,  they  were  born  of  immense  amounts  of  matériel  derived  from
military  space-research  programs,  most  notably  that  of  SAGE  (Semi-Automatic  Ground
Environment),  the  technological  core  of  the  Cold  War,  and  the  source  of  all  of  the  technical
innovations  in  regard  to  automated  calculations  and  man-machine  interfaces,  without  which  a
program such as Spacewar, one of the first video games, would have been inconceivable (Edwards,
1997, Triclot, 2012b). 
It is at this point that an entirely new system of imagery emerges, supported by the two capabilities
key to information technology: computation and statistical sequencing. These military devices call
for  360°  visibility  from  a  central  position:  the  same  setup  as  that  of  the  panopticon  and  the
panorama. The iconic character of the imagery is totally opposed to the logic of an image caught on
film, without, however, undermining the viewer's confidence that the image viewed is a faithful
representation of the real thing. The image is converted once again, this time toward abstraction and
the mastery of space. This abstraction generates its own ghosts, traces of real objects, enemy planes,
which blink their way across the screen, conveyors of death – their own as well as that of the others.
This dimension, of conversion or reactivation of prior powers, is even more salient when it comes to
the  second great  technological  lineage  of  video games,  that  of  the  technologies  of  mechanical
amusements.  Video  games  are  located  at  the  juncture  between  computer  technology  and  the
fairground. They prove to be hugely popular when they emerge from the military-research labs and
horn in on the shopping-mall arcades. This encounter produces what one called at the time TV
Games, on account of the coupling of a television screen with an electronic device capable of
receiving and modifying the video signal. 
If the video-game inventions – the scenarios, the screen imagery and action, the rules of the game –
developed in  the  labs  are  profoundly different  from those in  the arcades,  the  reasons are  both
economic (profit being a function of the duration of the game) and cultural (a matter of the player's
feelings about a human-versus-machine game played in a public space). The layout of the playing
field, as it were, along with the player's gaze, is turned topsy-turvy. The game space is no longer
defined by the military logic of command-and-control but by the ludic logic of the amusement park.
The arcade  brings  back into  play,  as  the  speed of  video-games  action  steadily  accelerates,  the
dizzying experience of amusement-park rides, transporting its passengers to the far edge of an orbit,
an inch from derailment.  Moreover,  this  second lineage,  the offspring of the rather unexpected
union of  electro-technology and the  shopping-mall  arcade,  reinvents  the  use  of  the  single-user
screen, the arrangement of the rows of machines uncannily akin to that of Edison's Kinetoscopes.
To these two lineages must be added the technoscientific program of virtual reality, especially the
work  of  Ivan  Sutherland,  which  serves  as  the  technological  basis  for  imagery  endowing  two-
dimensional images with the illusion of three-dimensionality, and endowing the player with the
power to manipulate them. Virtual reality is a bric-à-brac of more or less successful innovations –
three-dimensional-image calculations, stereoscopic vision, illusion of motion, etc. – on the one hand
and, on the other, an ideology of looking, by which immersion in the images supplants the old
reality illusion of cinema – abolishing the frame, permitting a mobile perspective – as if, by means
of the overwhelming force of technological supremacy alone, it  were possible to rediscover the
properties that belong to natural vision (Triclot, 2013). An apparatus such as Morton Heilig's 1962
Sensorama, a projection cabin for an audience of one, is a transitional phenomenon, between the
desire for full-immersion cinema and the arcade terminal. 
Thus the body of video games is no less a composite than is that of cinema, certain key elements of
which  it  turns  to  its  own use,  all  the  while  mixing  into  its  matrix  all  sorts  of  heterogeneous
novelties. But one of the distinguishing characteristics of video games is, secondly, that they never
achieve a stable position of dominance. If cinema can be likened to a house, the world of video
games is "un terrain vague," which can be translated as "a vacant lot" but also as "a wasteland"
(Sztulman, 2012). The centrality of the experience of the movie theater is something for which
video games have no equivalent. Not only have many different ways of playing, many different
game layouts  and settings  –  computer  labs,  shopping-mall  arcades,  the  recreation  room or  the
bedroom – existed, and for long periods of time, but this multiplicity of forms of practice and styles
of play continues today.
Third, Bellour's technological lineages permit consideration of the gap between cinema's body and
that  of  video  games,  beyond  the  vast  one  of  interactivity.  Certain  elements  persist.  Thus  the
reconversion  of  a  position at  the  center  of  a  circular  structure in  a  frontal  device  undoubtedly
constitutes the chief way in which video games perpetuate the logic of cinema. If cinema eliminates
the panorama's mobile gaze in the name of frontal projection, even as it reintegrates movement
within the film,  video games complete  the process,  permitting the displacement  of the player's
viewpoint within the illusion of a three-dimensional volume presented on the screen. Video games
restore to the image the seemingly random, unpredictable mobility of an individual walking around
in a given space. They reinject into the cinematographic framework a mobile perspective that had
been sacrificed to the demands and limitations of the recording and projection circuitry (Boyer,
2012). 
What distinguishes the video-game device from that of cinema is perceptual in two respects: an
increase not only in the viewer's individualization but also in the fluidity of the temporal dimension.
When a player assumes position facing the screen, the setting and the theater disappear, the mass of
viewers giving way to a single player (perhaps ringed by a few onlookers). There remains, however,
the sensation of being absorbed by one's visual perception, the fascination induced by a brilliant and
dazzling  expanse  of  light  suddenly  engulfing  one's  field  of  vision.  The  video-game  screen  is
individualized,  domesticated,  to  the point  of being a  portable  unit,  reducing to  a minimum the
distance between screen and face, engendering a sort of envelopment or intimacy, not far from the
unrealized dream of a cine-book. 
But the most obvious rupture between the two media can be seen in the absence from video games
of  any  trace  of  the  photogram,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the  combination  of  movement  and
immobility fundamental to film, on the other. This absence raises the question of the realism of the
imagery – video games being driven to mimic the hardware of photography, including its defects,
but it also implies, deep within the images, a completely different relationship to time. In her 1991
study  "Film  Bodies:  Gender,  Genre,  and  Excess"  Linda  Williams  identifies  the  three  time
dimensions that characterize three film genres, melodrama, horror, and pornography: the too-late of
melodrama, the too-early of horror, the on-time of pornography. It is precisely melodrama's too-late
dimension, this relationship with the past, revealed in the captured image, that video games lack.
This lack no doubt accounts for the affinity of the video-game medium with, on the one hand, the
horror genre and the sort of tension that it implies in regard to forthcoming events, and, on the other,
pornography and its guarantee of ready availability. Video-game designers, floating weightless in
the eternal now of the digital universe, operate without reference to the dimension fundamental to
melodrama. The phenomenon of subjective memory falls outside the bounds of the medium, which
grants little space to reflections regarding one's past selves (Boutet, 2012b). 
Cinematic state, ludic state, mini-hypnoses 
 In Bellour's analysis, the evolution of moviemaking devices touches on the issue of hypnosis. In
fact, hypnosis belongs to the genre of popular shows, which evolved in tandem with cinema. But
Bellour summons it back in the hope that it can help explain just what is happening to a viewer
mesmerized by a film. At this point we shift from an analysis of the apparatus to that of its effects
on the viewer's body. The aim of this analysis is to determine the type of connection that the film-
watching  or  game-playing  experience  triggers:  either  "the  reality  effect"  or  the  sense  of
"immersion." 
Is this to say that the effect of watching films or playing video games is akin to a hypnotic state?
The differences are as important as the similarities. At best, the two acitivities seem to induce a
slight  state  of  hypnosis,  on  the  order  of  Erickson's  "ordinary  trance"  (Roustang,  p.  72).  The
hypnosis  analogy,  while  not  a  perfect  fit,  is  useful  in  that  it  highlights  those  traits  shared  by
spectator  and  player  –  immobilization,  visual  focus,  monotony  and  rhythm,  submission  to  the
actions of an apparatus that is indifferent to the viewer's wishes – just how these activities produce a
certain paranormal physical and mental state, distinctly different from the ordinary waking state.
An examination of the concept of hypnosis, as presented by Roustang, reinforces this analogy. In
his  analyses  Roustang  insists  that  the  active  properties  of  the  hypnotic  state  are  all-important
beyond the momentary suspension of the subject's "normal," waking, state. The immobilization that
is part of the hypnosis procedure is compounded by the emergence of a growing watchfulness. This
melange of immobilization, over-vigilance, and proliferating images characterizes to perfection the
video-game situation. 
Considered individually, each of the elements that compose Roustang's description of the hypnosis
process can be correlated with those of the video-game setup even more closely than with that of
cinema. The initial moment when the subject suddenly goes under, this altered state – the rupturing
of the routine of normal perception – finds an equivalent, of course, in both activities. But one
element, the mobility of the eyes and the hands, recalls most directly the physical state of the video-
game player, not of the film viewer.
The most  problematic  issue,  the one in which the cinema and video games alike diverge from
hypnosis, is that of "confusion or uncertainty." Roustang explains that the mental state induced by
hypnosis differs from that induced by watching a film in that it leads the subject to focus on an
endogenous as well as imaginary scenario. The images are produced by the subject; the subject is
not merely receiving visual and auditory signals transmitted from some outside source. However,
the use of (external) images to liberate the (internal) imagination is part and parcel of standard
hypnosis techniques. An interesting aspect of this situation is that the confusion engendered by the
immobilization and focalization that characterize hypnosis obliterates the border between the self
and the world beyond it. This confusion in regard to place and position conjures up, of course, the
video-game setup, and more particularly those games that involve the projection of the player into
an onscreen alter  ego,  or  "avatar."  There  is  no  doubt  that  this  projection  engenders  a  state  of
disorientation. Recordings of players' verbalizations during avatar games feature the phrases "Hey,
where are you?" and "Hey, who are you?" – evidence of considerable doubt as to the player's own
whereabouts relative to the scene on the screen (Boutet, Colon de Carjaval, Ter Minassian, Triclot,
2013). 
Finally, the crucial point of the process of hypnosis, as described by Roustang, has to do with what
he calls "the power to reconfigure the world," a matter of opening up possibilities: in short,  of
wielding power. Bellour's argument that of all the arts cinema "is the most directly invested in this
'power to reconfigure the world'"  makes one wonder about the characteristics specific to video
games. Bellour acknowledges elsewhere that "the overture toward modification and action" seems
difficult to situate in cinema, "in which one has seen above all else a loosening of the rules, a state
of neglect,  a degree of inaction worthy of the powerlessness that  is  cinema's motive force and
principle" (Bellour, 2009, p. 115). Bellour next summons forth "the megalomania that goes along
with  the  cinematic  setup  (found  in  all  sorts  of  identification  systems),  and  that  favors  the
omnipotence of thoughts" (Bellour, 2009, p.117). Behind the banal business of identifying with the
characters, the most important feature of cinema is that this identification floats along in the current
of the narrative and passes through all of the film's bodies. 
How could one not see here, in the video-game experience, and by way of an entirely different
arrangement of images, the extension of this experience of the body, at  one and the same time
immobile and projected into a variety of super-mobile bodies? This experience of reconfiguring the
world by assuming control of the movement of the images, is rooted in the very heart of video
games; this opening onto an array of worlds, each offering, in turn, an array of routes, is what
defines  the  character  of  the  medium.  Game  sessions  are  made  of  "successions  of  interesting
decisions," in the words of game designer Sid Meier, which in turn are stepping stones to potential
futures.  This  experience,  which  Roustang  associates  with  children's  games,  brings  us  back  to
Dewey's  observations  regarding the  qui  vive,  the  alertness  of  the  lookout  who rediscovers  the
potentialities of the world around him (Dewey, 1915, p. 54). 
The hypnosis analogy thus highlights what exactly becomes of the viewer's (in the case of cinema)
or the player's body (in the case of video games), the strange state into which it is plunged. It opens
the way to a description of the different modes of engagement of the body in images, be they those
of film or of video games.
 
Primary affects and emotions of the apparatus
Having dealt with the composition of the film apparatus and the ways in which the viewer's body is
involved, Bellour turns his attention back to the film's' body – to the ways in which the interactions
of the cinematographic apparatus, the film, and the viewer's body produce the emotions specific to
cinema. To be moved emotionally by the film's body presumes that one is moved by it physically as
well, that one is in sync with its speed shifts, is registering the shocks and breaks in the sensorial
framework which are associated with the various bodies traversing the film. Thus a close reading of
Kenji Mizoguchi's Miss Oyu permits Bellour to identify four emotional registers, which by their
interpenetration come to constitute the viewer's  experience.  The first  level,  that  of intensity (in
Deleuze's sense, of a spatio-temporal dynamism) is the product of the the rhythmic modulation with
the shot. This is the emotion of the cinema at its birth: the fluttering of leaves in the background of
one of the Lumière brothers' earliest efforts, Repas de bébé ("Baby's meal") and the almost equally
abstract, crowd-in-motion patterns of La Sortie des usines Lumière à Lyon ("Employees leaving the
Lumière factory"):  "emotion belonging to the world when it  is  charged with activity,  from the
moment when it is caught by the camera" (Bellour, 2009, p. 142). 
 
This dimension, which is concerned with movement within the images, is evidently also vital to
video games. It plays a fundamental role there, not only because video games tend to favor an
action script unmodified by any editing, composed of shots of a relatively extended duration, but
also and above all insofar as the breaks within each shot oblige a physical response on the part of
the player. This rhythmic dimension of the video-game experience, the necessity of maintaining a
sort of dance step with the images, constitutes the very first stratum of the emotions specific to
video-game play. Above and beyond all else is this body-to-body connection with the apparatus, by
way  of  which  the  modulations  within  the  shot  create  a  sort  of  visual  echo  in  the  reflexive,
mimicking motion of the player's body. 
That here there is a sort of emotion that does not fit into the standard psychological categories can
be illustrated by the example of the game Asteroids (Atari, 1979), one of the stars (as it were) of the
first age of the arcade, distinguished by its use of vectorial graphics. The player pilots a spaceship
though a maze of high-speed asteroids. The player can fire on the asteroids, to clear a path, but
instead of going up in smoke they burst into fragments, which only further complicate the obstacle
course. 
Asteroids constitutes a remarkably elegant, design-wise, solution to the problem of the maze as an
obstruction hindering the avatar's movement: not only is the maze in motion instead of static but its
motion  is  a  function  of  that  of  the  player.  Whereas  the  video-game  space  is,  as  a  rule,  a
comprehensible one – a pure, abstract container – in Asteroids it is the expression of the player's
bodily gestures. In this unprecedented rapport between player and play space, there is a sort of
primal  emotion,  born  of  the  interplay  between  screen  and  body,  that  has  yet  to  be  translated
accurately into the language of psychology.
Upon these intense emotions are constructed what Bellour terms "textual emotions" or "system
emotions." The latter result from the effects of visual overlap in successive shots, of the memory's
activity, be it conscious or unconscious, which the film amasses. It is undoubtedly difficult to derive
from a video game the quality of these "system-based" emotions such as those that Bellour finds in
Mizoguchi's films. The extended duration of the sequences and the absence of control, on the part of
the game's designers, over a given player's moment-by-moment playing of the game weaken the
effects of construction within the image-based discourse which they might otherwise be able to
achieve. From this point of view, it seems that video games will never achieve the level of sustained
discourse that exists in cinema.
This negative conclusion brings us back, once again, to just what distinguishes each of the two
genres when it comes to emotions. The role of repetitive practice, necessary to the mastery of key
elements in the motion of onscreen figures is, in fact, central to the video-game experience. If a
system-based emotion is at work in video games, it  is no doubt more likely to be found in the
player's body language than in the game's various visual effects, on the screen. This bifurcation
between the experiential  constitutions of the two media marks the point  at  which the narrative
power of video games is diminished, but at the same time another way of experiencing images
opens up.
The remaining two strata of emotions are not specific to either medium. The "symbolic emotion"
takes us back to the cultural order, to the mobilization of figures, to the task of identifying with a
story's  personae.  The  "apparatus  emotions"  are  generated  by  the  medium's  recalling  its  formal
properties. In his description Bellour emphasizes the way these different emotions fold back upon
one another.  The  system emotions  imply  the  primary,  rhythmic  work  at  the  heart  of  the  shot.
Bellour's analysis permits us to sharpen the definition of what can be deemed specific to the video-
game experience,  beyond symbolic  constructions,  the logic of identifications,  and to  imagine a
connection with the image different from that of cinema, a relationship on which are conveyed,
more or less securely, the secondary emotions. 
The reference to David Stern and to his conceptualization of the newborn is particularly relevant
here, in that it clarifies what happens at the juncture between the body of the film and that of the
viewer. Stern's conception of "amodal perception" as a defining feature of the first "sense of an
emergent self" touches on sensation at its origin, pinpointing there variations in intensity, repetition
of  temporal  patterns,  pulsation  and rhythms,  all  of  which  pass  from one sensorial  modality  to
another. Associated with this primary mode of perception are found what Stern calls the "affects of
vitality,"  in  order  the  distinguish  them  from  the  standard  emotions,  or  "affects  of  category"
(happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, etc.). 
These affects of vitality can be qualified only by means of dynamic terms: "These elusive characters
are  better  rendered  by  dynamic,  kinetic  terms,  such  as  'rise,'  'vanish,'  'fleeting,'  'crescendo,'
'decrescendo,' 'burst,' 'stretch out,' etc. " (Stern, 1989, p. 78). Stern alludes to dance to illustrate what
is at work in this first register of experience. We are back with Kirkpatrick and his notion of video
games as a dance with the joystick (Kirkpatrick, 2011). This dimension corresponds to an idea that
Stern develops under the name of "affective attunement," a phenomenon founded on a principle of
imitation connecting the affects of vitality of one sensorial modality with those of another. One of
the examples that Stern offers is that of a mother who dances before her child and reacts to the
child's entreaties: "A nine-month-old becomes very excited by a toy and grabs it. In response, her
mother glances at her child, twists her shoulders, and performs a frenzied fox-trot, twisting her torso
like a nightclub dancer. These joyous contortions last about as long as the daughter's "Aaaaah."
(Stern, 1989, p. 183). 
We now arrive at play, the intermediary zone between the mere repetition of a shape and the random
variation.  This  combination  of  a  cyclical  movement  modified  by  another  one  seems  to  be
particularly characteristic of the pattern of the arcade experience, at the heart of video games. The
kinetic  experience  of  the  arcade  is  not  a  simple  duel  between  a  flesh-and-blood  body  and  a
mechanical one but rather the modulation of each by the other. The dominant mode of the games
arcade is, in fact, acceleration, but this great crescendo is alleviated by landings between the levels,
where one can catch one's breath; or, better yet, it incorporates breathing spaces, the right touch at
the right moment delivering a momentary respite, the wrong touch, on the other hand, driving the
game forward toward saturation and the announcement "game over." Beyond those game-theory
concepts that are easy to grasp – high score, competition, self-mastery – Stern's affective attachment
makes it possible to give form to the one-on-one battle between the player's body and the game's
body waged at the center of the action.
To conclude:  The concept  of the body of video games thus  permits access to  the fundamental
constituents of the game-playing experience, which until now have been largely disregarded by the
games-studies  literature;  Video games  are  characterized  by  many different  arrangements  of  the
players' bodies vis-à-vis the onscreen bodies, from which arise the range of specific affects. This
primary work of subjectivization, by which a body is fashioned for the apparatus, is the prerequisite
of the psychological processes, undoubtedly richer and more complex, that involve the ensemble of
the cultural framework, the logic of identifications and of empathy. All the same, beginning as early
as these first strata, which we tend to neglect or to regard as a place of sheer repetitions devoid of
sense or value, a sort of exposure of one body to the powers of other bodies, a heightening of the
imagination, is taking shape, and it possesses a range of intense emotions all its own.
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